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Abstract 
In this paper, I will present what I take to be a standard view of morality, and I argue that 
this view amounts to a paradox: the moral event or moral concern, the source of morality, 
ultimately leads, through moral theory, to a denial of itself. I will show how Badiou and 
Levinas take a way out of this and in doing so deny the possibility of anticipating the 
moral. Furthermore, I claim that this anticipatory moment can be introduced back by 
means of the concept of “practical wisdom” as used in analytical virtue ethics. Finally, I 
argue that the Kantian notion of the sublime is structurally the same as the moral event in 
Badiou and Levinas, and that our view of the sublime can benefit from both Levinas’ 
view and the concept of “practical wisdom” as well. 
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Introduction 
As so many endeavours, morality can be seen as an anticipatory activity. A moral theory, 
understood as a more or less systematized and more or less explicit set of rules of how we 
should act, what kind of persons we should be, which states of affairs in the world are 
desirable and which are not, is a conceptual tool built for a certain purpose, and that 
purpose seems to be an anticipatory one. Let me explain this further. 
 
Moral theories do not come falling from the sky. As every theoretical constructions, they 
originate out of a specific kind of event within our daily life-world. In this case, the event 
is the morally sensitive situation, i.e. a situation in which we are, in some sense morally 
“perplexed”. Typical examples are moral dilemmas, cases where are moral intuitions 
conflict and in which we are baffled by the fact that there seems no other possibility than 
violating a moral intuition. In situations such as these we do not know immediately what 
to do, in which, in other words, a stimulus is not self-evidently followed by the 
appropriate response. The decisive feature of this kind of situation is therefore the 
temporal gap between stimulus and response. As Henri Bergson has argued in Matière et 
Mémoire, this temporal gap between stimulus and response is constitutive of temporal 
consciousness in general, and through this, of subjectivity itself. (Bergson 1934, for a 
discussion of Bergson’s view with regard to anticipation, see Froeyman 2010) Therefore, 
if we grant that subjectivity can be seen as a practice or a property rather than a thing, it 
can be defined as the ability of being “perplexed” i.e. as the ability of being struck by 
morally sensitive situations.  
 
But of course, being perplexed by a moral dilemma is not a pleasant situation. As a 
consequence, man develops systematized valuations of these situations, which reduce the 
gap between stimulus and response and which can assure us that we will not be as 
perplexed as we could be by future moral dilemmas. By doing this, they prepare us for 
future perplexing situations. They allow us to take a justified decision and therefore get 
out of future morally problematic situations more rapidly and more easily. For example, if 
we doubt between going to war to protect our family and kill our enemies who are after 
all human beings of their own, moral theories allow us to make a confident choice. They 
can state that loyalty towards one’s own family is more important than kindness towards 
strangers, in which case one should fight. Or one could say that war is a bad thing in 
itself, and that all means should be taken to avoid it, in which case one should not. Or one 
could say there are just wars and unjust ones and offer criteria to distinguish one from the 
other, in which case it depends what kind of war one is in. Or one can be a utilitarian and 
try to base one’s decision on the possible outcome of the war on human welfare in 
general. And so on. All these theories reduce a practical and contingent situation to an 
arrangement of entities of a general kind (family, strangers, wars, a calculable notion of 
welfare). They reduce a contingent and perplexing situation, which cannot be anticipated, 
to a certain arrangement of general kinds, which can.  
 
Of course, the picture of morality I have sketched is not generally accepted. As the 
attentive reader will have noticed, it depends on the assumption that a moral sensitivity 
which predates moral rules is a genuine possibility. If one adheres to the view that moral 
rules are the result of non-moral reasons or motivations, as do social contract theories of 
morality, this view is invalid. However, I will leave this point of view aside here, and start 
from the premise that moral rules are secondary to morally sensitive situations and 
emotions, such as concern and sympathy. What I will do in this paper, is argue that this 
picture of morality is essentially paradoxical, and that this paradox centers around the 
notion of the possibility or impossibility of the anticipation of the unanticipatable. I will 
show that Alain Badiou take a radical way out of this paradox, while Emmanuel Levinas 
opts for a more nuanced option. Nevertheless, both philosophers discard the anticipatory 
aspect of moral theory. 
 
Titeltje 
What is striking about the picture of morality presented above, is that it seems to suggest 
that morality is a self-destroying practice. It source and essence is the morally relevant 
contingent situation. Nevertheless, the aim of moral theories, anticipatory 
systematizations of these situations, is exactly to reduce their importance. Moral theories 
help us to get over moral situations more quickly and more easily. By reducing them to 
arrangements of entities of a general kind, they lose their status as special and troubling 
events and become less and les important. So it seems that moral theories have a kind of 
Oedipus complex. The more they are developed and the better they are applied, the more 
they actually reduce the importance of the moral event, and the less “moral” they 
themselves become. For example, one can say that utilitarian theories originate from a 
concern with the well-being of others and the desire to maximize it wherever this is 
possible. Nevertheless, if a sufficiently sophisticated and practically applicable utilitarian 
moral calculus could be developed, this would have a negative influence on people’s 
concerns of other people’s well-being. If a lack of well-being is spotted in a certain person 
or a certain part of society, this would not be reason for moral concern any more, since 
one can be assured that this limited quantity of well-being is still the highest possible, or 
that the lack of well-being at one place is more than compensated by a surplus at a 
different place. In short, an adequate, utilitarian or otherwise, moral calculus would 
severely limit moral concern and moral sensibility, and therefore the roots of morality 
itself.  
 
Emmanuel Levinas and Alain Badiou have offered us ways out of this Oedipal conception 
of morality. Basically, they take the same essential move, namely denying that moral 
theories are essentially of a moral nature. However, they do this in slightly different ways. 
I will argue that Levinas’ view is, in the negative sense less radical, but in the positive 
sense much more subtle then Badiou’s. 
 
Badiou’s view on ethics, most concisely expressed in l’éthique, is radical in many ways. 
Badiou attacks the traditional view on ethics in the Western world, especially the way it is 
used in international politics. Moral(istic) discourse as it is present in international 
politics, for example in justifying wars, humanitarian or political interventions, economic 
regulations and so on, is based on the (Kantian) idea of the universality of ethical theories. 
The main target here are human rights, the prototype of a moralistic theory which 
proclaims itself to be universal and independent of cultural differences and concrete moral 
situations and events. As we have seen, this universal theorizing can lead to a lessening of 
moral concern and moral sensitivity. But this is not Badiou’s point. His main problem 
with this kind of moralistic is that it is based on the ideas of evil and victimhood. The 
standard moral situation is a situation in which harm is done to a victim by evil, as a result 
of which the victim has to be saved by a good “prince on a white horse”, which is 
inevitably is the West, NATO or the Americans. The whole idea of a universal moral 
system such as human rights is built on this idea of victimhood and evil in order to justify 
the “good” of Western interventionism. Of course, this means that the good is defined in 
terms of the evil, and the virtuous person in terms of the victim, which, according to 
Badiou, is anti-emancipating.  
 
The solution Badiou proposes is as radical as his diagnosis. Badiou opts for a radically 
contingent view on ethics and morality, stating that morality and human subjectivity only 
have a place in real contingent situations, not in theoretical generalizations. (p 38-39 in 
nederlands??) Badiou connects this with a strongly Heideggerian notion of truth. 
According to Badiou, the subject can be overwhelmed by “truth-processes”, events which 
change our world view and which lead us to action. What is important about this events is 
that they are uncompromisingly singular; they are limited to a specific and contingent 
subject, place and time. (Badiou names politics, love, art and science). Because these 
events cannot be denied or refused, there is no place for choice, and therefore no place for 
morality as well. Morality only comes in afterwards, when we have the choice of whether 
or not we will remain faithful to the event. According to Badiou, good people stay 
faithful, while bad people betray their events. This happens by means of naming the 
event. If the event has a name, it can still have an effect afterwards, after it has gone. 
 
If we compare Badiou’s view with the paradoxical idea of morality described above, we 
can see why this is a radical move. Badiou flatly denies the anticipatory aspect of 
morality. The role of ethical and moral theories, if they play a role at all, is not to 
anticipate future events, but do justice to past ones. Of course, one could say that it is 
possible to anticipate the way in which one can do justice to future events, but this 
actually seems rather futile, since the event is essentially singular and therefore breaks 
through existing conceptual schemes and categorizations. Because of this, any 
categorization made beforehand will always be inadequate after the event. This also mean 
that Badiou cannot offer us any more practical guidelines than the general maxime: “Be 
faithful to your event!”. 
 
Levinas 
According to Levinas, on the other hand, the foundation and source of morality lies in the 
Other1 (L’Autre), and the foundation ethics of lies in eschatology or, in other words, the 
study of transcendence, the movement towards the Other. (Introductie T&I) Therefore, the 
moral event per se is the appeal of the face2 of the other (autrui) in which something of 
the order of the transcendent Other comes through. Levinas calls the ability to do so the 
epiphany of the face. (IT B5) The sphere of the Other is contrasted with the sphere of The 
Same, which consists of both our everyday life-world, which Levinas calls the 
“economy”, and our theoretical activity, which he calls the “light”. The essence of the 
Other is that it breaks through the sphere of The Same, through the comfortable, 
predictable and safe net of science and everyday life. 
 
The image Levinas sketches of this event is similar to the one sketched above. The appeal 
of the face of the other is not a pleasant situation. (see IT, IB2, IIB1) It leads to worries en 
self-sacrifice, and it has a general discomforting atmosphere (AE, II 4d) The realization 
that I am morally not in a position to demand the same things of the other which I demand 
of myself puts my world view into question (T&I, B1) This is a sharp contrast with non-
moral daily life, which Levinas refers to as the “atheist I”, and which is enough in itself, 
generally without a discomforting element. It is, in other words, closed. The moral or 
                                                 
1
 Levinas makes a difference between the Other as a metaphysical principle (l’autre), exemplified in our 
relation to death, and the Other as a person (autrui). Since this distinction is hard to maintain in English, I 
will use the term “Other” with a capital “O” to refer to the first meaning, and “other” with a small “o” to the 
second. 
2
 Again, there is a bit of a translation problem here. The French word Levinas uses, visage, expresses a kind 
of respectful and venerable attitude which the English word “face” does not. By lack of a proper alternative, 
however, I will stick to the word “face”. The reader is therefore invited to interpret this term in the most 
venerable sense possible. 
ethical relation on the other hand, is always an unfulfilled desire and never a closure. 
(B2). Furthermore, my relation with the other takes away my freedom (at least one kind 
freedom), in the sense that it makes me dependent of the other. (IT C1, C3f)  
 
However, Levinas’ view on moral theories is somewhat different. Theorized and 
systematized are not a consequence of the other per se. The sphere of justice, in which 
moral and ethical theory have their use, only comes up in the sphere of the “Third”. (see 
AE, I8) The third can be intuitively grasped as the “other other”, the other which is not 
present, but which has a moral appeal nonetheless. Because the other other, and the other 
others, have a moral appeal as well, and because one cannot be susceptible to every single 
one of them, we have to formulate theories of justice. Now, as theories, they belong to the 
Same and do not have an ethical character. Nevertheless, they do originate from an ethical 
appeal, and therefore from a moral situation as well. So in Levinas’ view, the moral 
character of the moral event changes somewhat. What is important in a moral event such 
as dilemma for example is not the fact that two moral intuitions are in conflict. In fact, 
since the Other is an unexpected guest who turns our comfy conceptual and intuitional 
household upside down, it is even essential to the moral experience as such. The 
development of ethical theories is not a consequence of the discomforting element of the 
moral situation is such, but of the conflict between the interests of the other and the other 
other. Of course, it is still perfectly possible for such theories to reduce our sensitivity to 
the moral event and to negate our moral concern. But through this point, the development 
of ethical theories is no longer a necessary consequence of the moral event itself, but one 
which originates from the problem of comparing moral events. In comparison to Badiou, 
Levinas’ theory has the advantage that he can still see moral theories as moral 
phenomena, be it as consequences of moral events rather than as morally loaded entities 
in themselves. But this is still more than Badiou, who radically situates the moral at the 
contingent level. 
 
Levinas is less radical than Badiou, in the sense that Levinas’ theory is closer to common 
sense in the view that moral theories are still moral phenomena concerned with the well-
being of others. Nevertheless, Levinas just as Badiou seems to do away with the 
anticipatory character of moral and ethical theorizing. Theories are a consequence of the 
appeal of the other and the other other, and not a preparation or an anticipation. One could 
say that theory is a way of preparing for the future appeals of other others, but this would 
be a misjudgment on behalf of the status of the other other. The other other is still the 
other, and as such still breaks through every kind of theory, and therefore every kind of 
anticipation, we have. So although Levinas’ view makes it possible to understand how 
moral theories are moral without scrutinizing the moral event which leads to their 
development, it still does not clear the road for an anticipation of the moral. This seems to 
imply that it is impossible to anticipate the moral event, or in other words, to anticipate 
the unanticipatable. And this seems perfectly reasonable. Nevertheless, I argue that this is 
not the true, and that there is a way in which we can prepare ourselves for the 
unanticipatable moral event, by means of ethical theory. 
 
Virtue ethics. 
Besides the continental tradition to which Levinas and Badiou belong, there is a different 
tradition which also posits the irreducibility of the moral situation to theoretical schemes, 
namely virtue ethics. I will argue that some insights in virtue ethics allow us to re-
introduce the anticipatory aspect of morality. Depending on one’s point of view, one can 
see the result as a virtue ethical theory supplemented with the Levinasian notion of the 
appeal of the other, or a Levinasian ethics supplemented with the concept of “virtue”.  
 
In particular, there is one quite basic idea in virtue ethics which interests us in particular, 
and that concept is the so-called “uncodifiability thesis”. This thesis states, more or less, 
that it is a priori impossible to formulate a general rule or a set of rules the application of 
which guarantees the morally right choice in every situation. Or, in other words, it is 
impossible to formulate a kind of decisive “manual” for good behaviour which everyone 
could follow and understand. The thesis is usually supposed to stem from Aristotle 
(Aristotle 2006, II9) and is, as already said, strongly associated with virtue ethics. Exactly 
how strong is a matter of debate, but I agree with John McDowell stronger statement that 
“If the question “How should one live” could be given a direct answer in Universal 
terms, the concept of virtue would have only a secondary place in moral philosophy” 
(McDowell 1979, 347).  
 
It is only a small step from the uncodifiability thesis to the idea that moral events cannot 
be anticipated. And indeed, the idea that there is no general manual for moral behaviour 
fits remarkably with Levinas’ and Badiou’s view on the uniqueness and unprecendentness 
of  the moral event. The first is implied by the second, although the second is not by the 
first. Nevertheless, it is clear that virtue ethics puts much more weight on the specific 
nature of the moral situation than mainstream analytical ethics. (see for example 
Nussbaum 1985) Because of this, and as a result of virtue ethics’ general resistance 
against moral theorizing (verwijzingen???Pincoffs, McDowell, Anscombe, Hursthouse in 
Foot), it does indeed seem to be the case that in virtue ethics, generally speaking, the 
moral event is just as unanticipatable as it is in Levinas and Badou. What is interesting for 
us now is that virtue ethics has a special term for the sensitivity to the uniqueness of the 
moral event – phronesis or practical wisdom, which Levinas and Badiou do not. This 
allows virtue ethics to make a difference between with more or less practical wisdom. 
And this allows anticipation to come back in through the back door. Although we can not 
anticipate moral events in the sense that we will know the answer to the question “what 
should I do?” in advance, we can anticipate moral events as such. This is to say, we can 
prepare ourselves for the possibility of a moral event, and we can try to be ready for the 
unexpected by cultivating and developing practical wisdom. Instead of eliminating the 
unexpectedness of the moral event by putting it into a general scheme of some sort, we 
can ready ourselves by cultivating properties which allow us to deal with the unexpected 
as such. 
 
The key concept here is “practical wisdom”. A general deontological moral rule or a 
moral calculus such a utilitarian specifies more or less exactly with to do, regardless of 
details and specific circumstances. For example, if we state that the aim of moral action is 
to maximize well-being, it does not matter who’s well-being we are talking about. If we 
state that there is a general moral law such as “do not lie”, it doesn’t matter who it is we 
are being honest to. Virtues, on the other hand, do the exact opposite. Because virtues by 
definition need practical wisdom in order to be applicable to a given moral situation, it is 
in the nature of virtuous people to be sensitive to contingent details. For example, 
according to virtue ethics, it is not enough to be honest in order to be a virtuous person. 
One should be honest in the right way, to the right person, at the right time. This requires 
practical wisdom, sensitivity to contingent detail. (ref Aristoteles??) This entails that 
virtue ethics leaves space for the contingency and the uniqueness of a moral event, and at 
the same time allows us a way in which to anticipate these moral events. This is because 
practical wisdom does not come falling from the sky, but can be developed, cultivated, 
learned and taught. Of course, this does not happen in an explicit way, by developing a 
sort of structured manual, but in an implicit way, by narratives and examples. 
(verwijzingen??) Because of this, we can prepare ourselves for the perplexity of moral 
situations without reducing these situations to their general characteristics and without 
therefore losing the moral concern and moral sensitiveness which lays at the base of the 
moral phenomenon as a whole. Contrary to traditional ethical theories, anticipation of a 
moral event does not entail a prefabricated solution of the event. On the contrary, the most 
virtuous persons are often those who can admit that they do not know what should be 
done. (see Hursthouse in Foot). 
 
Esthetics & Kant 
The way in which I have characterized morality has a remarkable counterpart in 
aesthetics, more specifically in the Kantian notion of the “sublime”. Kant describes the 
feeling of the sublime as a feeling of abundance, something which is in a sense “too 
much” for our cognitive categories (paragraaf 25-29), combined with a feeling of 
harmony at the level of reason. The feeling of the sublime arises because of the interplay 
between the disharmony in the faculty of the understanding and the harmony at the level 
of reason. This bears a remarkable structural resemblance to Levinas’ en Badiou’s 
conceptions of the “moral event”. Just as in Badiou’s truth-processes and Levinas’s 
appeal of the other, the essence of the sublime event is that it surpasses our cognitive 
concepts. This clears the road for an appeal to a faculty other than cognition or 
understanding. In the case of Levinas, this is an appeal to our ethical sensitivity, while in 
the case of Kant and Kantian aesthetics in general, there is an appeal to reason, which 
results in an aesthetic benevolent feeling.  
 
Because there is a structural similarity between Kant’s view of the sublime and Levinas’ 
and Badiou’s view on the moral, there is also a structural similarity of the issues involved 
in this view. Just as in Levinas and Badiou, the Kantian event of the sublime cannot be 
anticipated, since it its essence is that it goes beyond the categories we have at our 
disposition. Nevertheless, it would be a good thing if we could do so. If we hold 
rigorously to the view that the sublime event cannot be anticipated, this leads to two 
negative consequences. The first is that we cannot be made less or more sensitive with 
respect to the sublime, which entails that aesthetic education is completely useless with 
respect to the sublime. The second is that sublime events, or works of art which aim at the 
feeling of the sublime, cannot be compared with each other. We cannot possible say that 
work A is better or worse than work B. So the Kantian view of the sublime seems to lead 
to the promotion of an uneducated and unsophisticated outlook and to a radical relativism 
of criteria. What I will argue now, is that we can use some of the insights developed 
above to solve these two problems.  
 
With regard to the problem of criteria, we find ourselves an ally in Levinas’ concept of 
the “third”, or the other other, as I have called. In a moral event which takes place 
between two persons, there is always the implicit appeal of the others not present at the 
moment itself. Likewise, we can only engage with one work of art at a time, but we 
always carry a background of experiences with other works of art with us. And because of 
this, we have to develop schemes in which these artistic experiences can be compared an 
weighed, just as we need systems of justice in the context of morality. What Levinas 
offers us now, is the view that, although such schemes originate from a direct moral and 
non-cognitive experience, they are not moral themselves, which means that they will 
always be necessarily inadequate with respect to a next moral event. Likewise, aesthetic 
criteria used for critical comparison are not the essence of what aesthetics or artistic 
experience is, but merely a necessary consesquence. As we have seen with Levinas, this 
kind of theory-building cannot be used for anticipatory purposes. 
 
With regard to the first problem (that of education), we can turn to the concept of “virtue”, 
as described above. As we have seen, this concept allows us to preserve the uniqueness of 
the moral event, through the introduction of practical wisdom. Analogously, one could 
introduce the concept of “aesthetic wisdom”, a sensitivity to the uniqueness and the 
details of a single piece of art. Just as moral wisdom, an person with a lot of aesthetic 
wisdom would know when which trait of a work of art is important, for example when 
one can transcend the formal boundaries of a work and when one cannot. Just as moral 
wisdom, aesthetic wisdom can be developed and cultivated, of course more by examples, 
narratives and concrete experience than by the explicit teaching of rules and criteria. 
 
Summary 
In this paper, I have presented what I take to be a standard view of morality, and I have 
argued that this view amounts to a paradox: the moral event or moral concern, the source 
of morality, ultimately leads, through moral theory, to a denial of itself. I have shown that 
Badiou and Levinas take a way out of this, at the cost of the possibility of anticipating the 
moral. Furthermore, I have claimed that this anticipatory moment can be introduced back 
by means of the concept of “practical wisdom” as used in analytical virtue ethics. Finally, 
I have argued the the Kantian notion of the sublime is structurally the same as the moral 
event in Badiou and Levinas, and that our view of the sublime can benefit from both 
Levinas’ view and the concept of “practical wisdom” as well. 
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